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Abstract
Human freedom is in tension with nomological determinism and with statistical 
determinism. The goal of this paper is to answer both challenges. Four contributions 
are made to the free-will debate. First, we propose a classification of scientific theo-
ries based on how much freedom they allow. We take into account that indetermin-
ism comes in different degrees and that both the laws and the auxiliary conditions 
can place constraints. A scientific worldview pulls towards one end of this classi-
fication, while libertarianism pulls towards the other end of the spectrum. Second, 
inspired by Hoefer, we argue that an interval of auxiliary conditions corresponds to 
a region in phase space, and to a bundle of possible block universes. We thus make 
room for a form of non-nomological indeterminism. Third, we combine crucial ele-
ments from the works of Hoefer and List; we attempt to give a libertarian reading of 
this combination. On our proposal, throughout spacetime, there is a certain amount 
of freedom (equivalent to setting the initial, intermediate, or final conditions) that 
can be interpreted as the result of agential choices. Fourth, we focus on the principle 
of alternative possibilities throughout and propose three ways of strengthening it.
Keywords Free will · Libertarianism · Physical theory · Auxiliary conditions · 
Principle of alternative possibilities · Nomological determinism · Statistical 
determinism · Indeterminism · Block universe · Phase space
1 Introduction
At least since the advent of Newtonian mechanics, an important aspect of the free-
will debate has revolved around the tension between freedom of will and nomologi-
cal determinism. Our focus in this article will be on the apparent irreconcilability 
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between libertarian free will,1 which is often considered as demanding more of free 
will than compatibilism, and nomological determinism in the context of a block uni-
verse, with fixed events throughout the entire four-dimensional spacetime. Despite 
our focus on libertarianism, we assume the closure of physics throughout and remain 
firmly grounded in a naturalist outlook on the world.
In the remainder of this section, we state the principle of alternative possibili-
ties and the challenges from determinism and indeterminism. In Sect. 2, we propose 
a classification of indeterminism in scientific theories. In Sect. 3, we take our cue 
from Carl Hoefer, who emphasized the importance of initial or intermediate condi-
tions in the context of the free-will debate. This leads us to a more fine-grained clas-
sification that is based both on laws and on auxiliary conditions. In Sects. 4 and 5, 
we elaborate on the compatibilist account of Hoefer and show how it can be adapted 
into a libertarian account by combining it with ideas on level dependence from 
recent work by Christian List. We briefly conclude in Sect. 6.
1.1  Principle of alternative possibilities
One important requirement for libertarian free will is that an agent could have acted 
otherwise under exactly the same conditions.2 Following Harry Frankfurt (1969), 
we call this ability to do otherwise the principle of alternative possibilities.3,4
Definition 1 Principle of alternative possibilities (PAP) The action of an agent is 
free only if the agent could have acted otherwise under exactly the same conditions.
Libertarian free will is challenged in at least two ways:
1. Challenge from determinism;
2. Challenge from indeterminism.
1 For an overview of the free-will debate, and the differences between compatibilism and libertarianism, 
see Kane (2011). The conversation between Kane, Fischer, Pereboom, and Vargas in Four Views on Free 
Will (Fischer et al. 2007) provides another introduction to the different views that are currently on the 
philosophical market.
2 Not everyone agrees with this requirement. Source incompatibilists, for instance, argue that as far as 
moral responsibility is concerned, the ability to do otherwise is irrelevant (Frankfurt 1969; Vihvelin 
2018). What is required for moral responsibility, in their view, is that an agent is the ultimate source of 
her actions. Leeway incompatibilists, in contrast, do take PAP to be crucial for free will (see also Per-
eboom 2003). In this paper, we do not aim to defend PAP as an important ingredient for free will: our 
analysis starts from the assumption that it is. For those who disagree, the subsequent analysis may be 
irrelevant.
3 In fact, the original term is ‘alternate’ possibilities. Although PAP was originally formulated in the 
context of discussions on moral responsibility, this will not be our focus here.
4 Even for philosophers who take PAP to be a necessary condition for libertarian free will, it is not a 
sufficient condition. Most libertarian authors include one or more additional principles as crucial for free 
will. List (2019), for instance, identifies three principles: (1) intentional agency, (2) alternative possibili-
ties, and (3) causal control. Nonetheless, the sole focus of our discussion below will be PAP.
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 We look at both challenges in turn, with particular attention to the tension with PAP 
(and variants thereof) and gauge whether they can be dealt with in a satisfactory 
way. The ultimate goal of this paper is to develop an account of libertarian free will 
that answers both of these challenges.
1.2  Challenge from determinism
In what follows, we adopt John Earman’s definition of determinism in terms of pos-
sible worlds (1986; see also Roberts 2006). Let 픚 be the class of possible worlds 
and consider the subclass of physically possible worlds W ⊂픚 . These are the 
worlds in which the same laws of physics apply as in our world.
Definition 2 Determinism The world w ∈ W is deterministic if and only if for any 
w∗ ∈ W and any time t , if w and w∗ agree on the complete physical state at t , then 
they agree on the complete physical state at all other times t′.5
Given a theory with deterministic laws, each possible history (i.e., a path in the 
associated phase space) corresponds to a possible world. In the context of specific 
physical laws, such as those from the theories of relativity, possible worlds can be 
regarded as ‘possible block universes’.
Note that Earman’s definition does not say why the world is deterministic. It does 
not specify the mechanism by which determinism is supposed to work. In this paper, 
we consider a specific form of determinism: nomological determinism, which is the 
view that the state of the world at time t , along with the laws of nature, determines 
the state of the world at all other times t′.
The jury is still out on whether our world is nomologically deterministic or not. 
Observe that it is a metaphysical thesis rather than a physical one: it requires a com-
parison across (physically) possible worlds, whereas experiments only tell us results 
about the actual one.6
Assuming nomological determinism and a full description of the physical world 
at a given time t , possibly before you were born, it is fully determined what the state 
of the world will be at any other point in time t′ , including those during and after 
you made your choices. So, PAP is incompatible with determinism. In summary, the 
challenge from determinism reads:
Challenge from determinism
(P1)  Libertarian free will requires PAP;
5 If w and w∗ only agree on the complete physical state at the times t′ > t , then w is said to be futuristi-
cally deterministic. Likewise, if w and w∗ only agree on the complete physical state at the times t′ < t , 
then w is said to be historically deterministic.
6 Observe also that determinism is an ontic thesis, whereas predictability is an epistemic one. Determin-
ism is therefore compatible with practical unpredictability: even in a deterministic world, we may not 
be able to practically carry out the retrodictions or predictions (for instance, because we do not know 
the laws of nature, or because we fail to attain complete knowledge of the state of the world at a certain 
time).
 Synthese
1 3
(P2)  Nomological determinism rules out PAP;
(C)  Free will and nomological determinism are incompatible.
The argument purports to show that there is no room for libertarian free will in a 
deterministic world.
1.3  Challenge from indeterminism
One common response to the challenge from determinism points to microphysi-
cal theories that are indeterministic, like quantum mechanics (but see Sect.  2). 
Another common response aims to argue that determinism at the microscopic 
physical level is compatible with indeterminism at the macroscopic agential level 
(see Sect. 5.1). Both strategies have in common that they regard indeterminism 
as indispensable for PAP and thus for free will. After all, in an indeterministic 
world, the state of the world at time t  is compatible with multiple states at time t′ . 
This seems to allow alternative possibilities, and hence to save PAP. But does it 
open up enough degrees of freedom to allow libertarian free will? Not all authors 
agree.
1.3.1  No half‑way house
Hard incompatibilists, such as Derk Pereboom (2001, 2005), defend the view that 
libertarian free will is neither compatible with determinism nor with indeterminism. 
Indeterminism (or randomness), they claim, is not the same as deliberate choice. 
The problem, in the words of Arthur Eddington (1939), is that there is no ‘half-way 
house’ between determinism and randomness. Either the world is deterministic, in 
which case we are prisoners of a deterministic chain. Or the world is indeterministic, 
in which case everything depends on sheer chance and fluke events.
This traditional challenge from indeterminism goes back to David Hume (1888) 
who considered it “impossible to admit of any medium betwixt chance and absolute 
necessity”. Hume’s fork, however, targets the principle of agential causation. Even 
if the world is indeterministic, it is not clear how an agent can use this indetermin-
ism to gain freedom. Although we do not dismiss this worry, it is not the target 
of our current discussion. Here, we want to focus on a different kind of challenge 
from indeterminism, or what we will call the challenge from statistical determinism, 
which challenges PAP but has received comparably little attention in the literature.
1.3.2  Challenge from statistical determinism
Indeterminism implies that there are alternatives, in the sense of multiple allowed 
future states consistent with a present state. Although this yields PAP, we claim that 
it is not yet sufficient for a strong sense of libertarian free will. To explain this, we 
propose to strengthen PAP as follows:
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Definition 3 Strengthened principle of alternative possibilities (PAP*) The action 
of an agent is free only if the agent could have acted otherwise under exactly the 
same conditions, unbounded by probabilistic constraints.
To motivate this move, suppose we accept, say, quantum mechanics as the source 
of indeterminism in the physical world. These forms of indeterminism carry a very 
limited sense of freedom: they come with a preset collection of alternatives associ-
ated with stable statistical properties (such as predictable measurement averages). In 
other words, they present us with a form of statistical determinism.
While PAP was challenged by determinism, PAP* is challenged by statistical 
determinism. In summary, the challenge from statistical determinism reads:
Challenge from statistical determinism
(P1)  Libertarian free will requires PAP*;
(P2)  Statistical determinism rules out PAP*;
(C)  Free will and statistical determinism are incompatible.
The argument purports to show that there is no room for libertarian free will in a 
probabilistic world. Libertarian free will and (probabilistic) indeterminism are 
incompatible notions.
1.3.3  Social, historical, and statistical determinism
The view that statistical regularities may threaten free will stems from the nineteenth 
century, although it has remained a minority position.7 As discussed by Ian Hacking 
(1983), the Belgian scientist and pioneer of statistical methods in the social domain, 
Adolphe Quetelet, already commented on the predictability of the numbers of yearly 
births and deaths and on the terrifying exactness of how crime rates are reproduced. 
This view extended to the moral domain, leading to a view of social determinism. 
Although Quetelet did not deny the existence of free will, other authors did. The 
English historian Henry Thomas Buckle (1865) defended historical determinism: 
he regarded the existence of stable statistics in the context of the social sciences as 
incompatible with human free will.
William James (1890), in his Principles of Psychology, came closest to the chal-
lenge from statistical determinism (although his comment is also related to the tra-
ditional challenge from indeterminism with respect to agential causation). As James 
observed, a brain exploiting some form of indeterminism in its decision-making pro-
cess would be “like dice thrown forever on a table.”
Unless they be loaded, what chance is there that the highest number will turn 
up oftener than the lowest? […] Can consciousness increase its efficiency by 
loading its dice? Such is the problem. Loading its dice would mean bringing 
7 See Mueller (2017) for a recent review and Saka (manuscript, and references therein) for a contempo-
rary defense.
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a more or less constant pressure to bear in favor of those of its performances 
which make for the most permanent interests of the brain’s owner; it would 
mean a constant inhibition of the tendencies to stray aside. (1890, 140, empha-
sis in original)
After the advent of quantum mechanics, some authors developed a similar view of 
statistical determinism in relation to this microphysical theory. For instance, Christof 
Koch (2012, p.104) wrote:
Given our current interpretation of QM [namely one that assumes collapses 
happen], a Popper-Eccles mind could exploit this idiosyncratic freedom. The 
mind would be powerless to change the probabilities, but it could decide what 
happens on any one trial. The mind’s action would always remain covert, sub 
rosa, for if we considered many trials, nothing out of the ordinary would take 
place: only what is expected from natural law. Conscious will would act in the 
world within the straightjacket of physics. It would be indistinguishable from 
chance.
Given that both determinism and statistical determinism are incompatible with 
PAP*, it may seem that we have ruled out libertarian free will entirely, from the 
armchair. However, we have not yet explored all possible forms of indeterminism. 
So far, we have silently equated indeterminism with probabilism, as is customary in 
the literature, but this is not the only option. To broaden the discussion, we propose 
to consider not just two, but four classes of theories.
2  Classification of theories
We propose a classification of theories, as shown in Fig.  1.8 Class I theories are 
deterministic and Class II theories are probabilistic. Our main observation is that 
the latter only covers a subset of all indeterministic theories. In probabilistic theo-
ries, all possible outcomes are (assumed to be) known and all possibilities have spe-
cific probabilities associated with them. This specification is already suggestive of 
additional classes of theories, which allow more freedom than Class II. Class III 
theories allow for probability gaps (i.e., possible outcomes without associated prob-
abilities; Hájek 2003),9 but no possibility gaps (i.e., cases in which even the list of 
possible outcomes is acknowledged to be incomplete), whereas Class IV theories 
also allow for the latter.
This fourfold classification resembles that of the ‘Johari window’ technique 
(Luft and Ingham 1955) with (I) known knowns, (II) unknown knowns, (III) known 
9 The economist John Maynard Keynes, in his Treatise on Probability (1921), argued that numerical 
probabilities are the exception rather than the rule. In most cases, probabilities are non-numerical and 
non-quantifiable because they are either unmeasurable or incomparable.
8 For now, the classification we propose applies to candidate (micro-)physical theories, at the most fun-
damental level. We will broaden its application to other levels in Sect. 5.
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unknowns, and (IV) unknown unknowns.10 To clarify our proposal, we give exam-
ples for each of the classes.
2.1  Class I theories
Newtonian physics is traditionally taken to be the paradigm example of a determin-
istic Class I theory. However, without additional conditions, classical mechanics is 
“not a paradise for determinism; in fact, Newtonian worlds provide environments 
that are quite hostile to determinism” (Earman 1986). If we understand Newtonian 
physics as including a condition or a postulate that ensures initial-value problems 
have unique solutions, then it does indeed serve as an excellent example for a Class 
I theory. (One such condition requires Lipschitz continuity: we return to this in the 
description of Class III.)
2.2  Class II theories
Quantum mechanics is often held as the paragon of a probabilistic Class II theory. 
This is only acceptable if we consider the Copenhagen interpretation or a spontane-
ous collapse interpretation. There also exist deterministic formalisms that are empir-
ically equivalent with quantum mechanics, such as Bohmian mechanics, which 
belongs to Class I.
Also statistical mechanics fits in this category, at least when judged at the macro-
level. Its probabilities, however, can be fully reduced to the deterministic micro-
level. So, judged at that level, it is a Class I theory. (In Sect. 5.1, we will return to 
this level-dependence.)
2.3  Class III theories
A concrete example of a Class III theory is provided by non-Lipschitz mechanics: 
that is, Newtonian mechanics without the constraint that guarantees uniqueness of 
the solution to initial-value problems. An example of such an indeterministic system 
was rediscovered by John Norton (2003), who considered an idealized point mass 
initially at rest on top of a frictionless dome of a particular shape. The initial-value 
problem admits of a singular solution, where the point mass remains at the apex 
forever, as well as an infinite family of regular solutions: the mass spontaneously 
slides down the dome in an arbitrary direction after an arbitrary period of time. Non-
Lipschitz mechanics does not supply probabilities for the two types of solutions, nor 
10 Class I and Class II theories both spell out which possibilities exist (knowns) and, provided sufficient 
boundary conditions, they single out a single possibility (known) or provide probabilities over multiple 
possibilities (which of those will pertain is unknown), respectively. Class III and Class IV theories both 
deal with multiple possibilities (unknowns), but the possibilities themselves may all be known or not, 
respectively.
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for the two variables in the family of regular solutions, thus providing us with a 
beautifully simple Class III example.11
2.4  Class IV theories
Class IV theories have possibility gaps. They allow for radically new possibilities, 
not specified by the theory, to be realized. Such theories may specify some possible 
outcomes, and even some relative probabilities of a subset of possible events, but at 
least under some circumstances they allow for radical openness regarding possible 
outcomes. The most radical Class IV theory has the form: ‘anything can happen’. 
The other Class IV theories specify possible outcomes (with or without associated 
relative probabilities) for some but not all circumstances. They allow for possibil-
ity gaps, but only in specific cases, which the theory specifies.
Finding examples for Class IV is harder than for previous classes. Formalizing a 
theory that allows for radical uncertainty is a thorny issue: it does not seem to square 
well with the notion of a phase space (see “Appendix 1”), which has to be speci-
fied beforehand.12 Another way of phrasing the difficulty is by observing that we are 
dealing with theories that aim to state their own incompleteness, which may well be 
impossible.13 As Class IV candidates, we may consider the most speculative theo-
ries from natural science (Kragh 2014) as well as metaphysical theories that allow 
for strong emergence. Strong emergence allows higher level properties to be incom-
putable from a full description in terms of lower level properties, and has been pro-
posed for various phenomena, including chemical reactions, life, and consciousness 
Fig. 1  Our proposed classification of physical theories
11 Norton’s (forthcoming) infinite lottery logic model for pocket universes, which explicitly rejects the 
assignment of probabilities, also belongs to Class III.
12 As such, the problem is similar to formalizing the notion of a catch-all hypothesis, which occurs in a 
probabilistic setting (Class II); see, e.g., Wenmackers and Romeijn (2016).
13 Indeed, this speculation pans out if we formalize it. Sentence φ is possible for theory T if and only if 
⊬T ¬φ (with ⊢ the deducibility relation). A theory with a possibility gap would simply be an incomplete 
theory and it is impossible for a theory to state its own incompleteness: it follows from Löb’s theorem 
that, if ⊢T ¬ProvT ¬φ (with  ProvT a provability predicate for T), then ⊢T φ and, hence, T is not incom-
plete. We are grateful to Jan Heylen for suggesting this addition.
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(O’Connor and Wong 2015). Because of the radical openness needed for emergent-
ism, this seems to require a Class IV theory.14
2.5  The need for a Class III theory
Hard incompatibilists have claimed that libertarian free will is incompatible with 
both determinism and indeterminism, as outlined in Sect. 1.3 (Pereboom 2005). We 
suggest it is more accurate to call this an incompatibility between free will on the 
one hand, and deterministic Class I and probabilistic Class II theories on the other 
hand. That is, rather than ruling out libertarian free will, the challenges from deter-
minism and statistical determinism push libertarians towards theories with Class 
III or even Class IV indeterminacies. Class III theories introduce probability gaps; 
Class IV theories introduce, in addition, possibility gaps. The question therefore 
becomes what degree of freedom is minimally needed to realize libertarian free will.
Historically, Class III theories have often been invoked by libertarians who hoped 
to embed their view in a scientific worldview. In the nineteenth century, important 
contributions to this debate were made by James Clerk Maxwell, Balfour Stewart, 
Antoine Augustin Cournot, and Joseph Boussinesq, as reviewed by Marij van Strien 
(2015). Boussinesq (1879) is of particular interest here, since he was well-aware of 
the challenges from determinism and statistical determinism, and therefore focused 
on non-Lipschitz mechanics (with examples similar to that of Norton, 2013) as a 
possible source of human freedom.15 This is clearly better than quantum mechan-
ics, which is only Class II and hence already in conflict with PAP*. However, even 
a Class III theory seems to limit the actions of free beings severely, since they can 
only choose from a predetermined menu of alternatives, as encoded by the phase 
space.
At first glance, this may seem insufficient for a strong sense of libertarian free-
dom which allows creativity and truly unforeseeable actions. For example, if you 
stand in a coffee bar, and you can only order what is on the menu, then this may 
make you doubt your free will. In order to be truly free, you may think, you should 
also be able to walk out, or to ask the barista to make you something that is not on 
15 Besides advocating this Class III theory to beat the challenge from statistical determinism, Bouss-
inesq also stipulated a non-physical, non-mechanical influence which he called the principe directeur 
and which could direct choices, thereby filling the gap between physical reality and the mathematical 
description of Class III systems (Mueller 2015; Bordoni 2017). The postulation of a principe directeur 
ran against the doctrines of materialism and positivism, and may be explained by Boussinesq’s sympathy 
for the spiritualistic philosophy developed by Cousin, Vacherot, Caro and Janet, among others. Accord-
ing to the spiritualist doctrine, matter and motion are insufficient to provide a complete description of 
nature. Boussinesq thus attempted to save the freedom of will by postulating a spiritualistic metaphys-
ics. The same has happened in more recent times. As Kane observed, many libertarians have posited 
“transempirical power centers, immaterial egos, noumenal selves outside of space of time, unmoved 
movers, uncaused causes and other unusual forms of agency or causation” in order to answer the chal-
lenge from physicalism, “thereby inviting charges of obscurity or mystery against their view” (Fischer 
et al. 2007, p. 9).
14 Depending on the interpretation of levels, however, this may yield a Class IV theory that does not 
apply to the microphysical level. We discuss this level-dependence in Sect. 5.1.
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the menu (a filter coffee with added sugar, say). This thought might motivate a fur-
ther strengthening of PAP*, which could only be fulfilled by a Class IV theory.
We argue, however, that this may be asking too much. After all, the fact that you 
cannot turn in a seahorse right now should not make you doubt your free will. So 
perhaps the requirement is not having unlimited but sufficiently many possibili-
ties, which are not bounded by probabilities. We use this additional desideratum to 
strengthen the PAP* criterion further:
Definition 4 Strong principle of alternative possibilities (PAP**) The action 
of an agent is free only if the agent could have acted otherwise under exactly the 
same conditions, with sufficiently many alternatives unbounded by probabilistic 
constraints.
PAP** is satisfied in Class III theories. As such, our classification has helped us 
to clarify the traditional dynamics of the debate, with Class II as the gulf between 
determinists and libertarians.
However, we want to achieve more than mapping the terrain of old debates. One 
of our goals is to answer the challenge from determinism without giving up deter-
minism or PAP**. To do this, we should return our focus to the case where the 
micro-level laws remain fully deterministic. But how can we get PAP** if the world 
is governed by Class I deterministic laws? To overcome this seemingly unbridge-
able divide, we need a new map—one which adds an additional dimension to the 
debate. We offer a suggestion for such a map in the next section.
3  Classification of theories with auxiliary conditions
Our previous classification can be refined by taking into account an important 
insight from Hoefer (2002).
3.1  The importance of auxiliary conditions
According to Eugene Wigner (1995, p. 699), Isaac Newton’s greatest accomplish-
ment was “the sharp distinction between initial conditions and laws of nature”.16 
Given that the initial conditions are often “quite arbitrary”, the “prime focus” of 
physics has been the discovery of new laws of nature. But it is the laws of nature 
together with the initial conditions of the system which determine the behavior 
of that system. The laws alone are not sufficient. The inital conditions, after all, 
describe the state of the system at a definite time. Without a specification of the 
initial positions and velocities of the planets, for instance, Newton’s laws are mute.
16 To the initial conditions and laws of nature, Wigner also added invariance principles, which he 
regarded as metalaws (laws which the laws of nature have to obey).
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In Sect. 1.2, we have seen why determinism seems to preclude free actions. But 
Hoefer (2002) has reminded us that even deterministic laws, which leave no free-
dom for how one thing leads to another, do not constrain how things are at a given 
instant. After all, the laws do not determine their own auxiliary conditions—i.e., ini-
tial, intermediate or final conditions or boundary conditions.17 In that sense, they 
still allow a lot of freedom and the same laws of nature are compatible with multiple 
temporal evolutions. Hoefer, in other words, finds freedom not in the laws of nature, 
but in the auxiliary conditions. We use this idea here to refine our classification; we 
return to other aspects of Hoefer’s (2002) work in Sect. 4.2.
3.2  Refined classification of theories
In Fig. 1, we classified theories into four classes. In the description, we focused on 
the laws. Now, taking into account Hoefer’s (2002) message about auxiliary condi-
tions, we present a refinement of our classification: as shown in Fig. 2, it still has 
four classes, but for each Class, we make an additional distinction according to the 
origin of the indeterminism. Classes Ia, IIa, IIIa, and IVa are classified as such due 
to indeterminism in the laws; Classes Ib, IIb, IIIb, and IVb are classified as such due 
to indeterminism in the initial values.18
For example, Bohmian mechanics is Class Ia and Class IIb, so Class II overall, 
which is the same as orthodox quantum mechanics (Class IIa). This example shows 
that only the classes in Fig. 1 are essential if we care only about distinguishing phys-
ical theories up to observational equivalence (cf. footnote 33).
As a second example, the proposal of Boussinesq (1879) had a law with prob-
ability gaps combined with fully specified initial conditions. Hence, it is a Class IIIa 
theory according to our refined classification. Following Hoefer (2002), we stick to 
deterministic laws but consider non-probabilistic constraints on the auxiliary condi-
tions. In other words, we are looking for a Class IIIb theory.
4  The conditional interpretation of PAP
In this section and the next one, we introduce recent work by List (2014, 2019a, b), 
which we wish to combine in a novel way with further ideas of Hoefer (2002).
A first idea we wish to follow is List’s (2019b) distinction between two different 
interpretations of PAP. In this section, we focus on the conditional interpretation of 
PAP. (We will consider the modal interpretation in Sect. 5.)
17 Hoefer published his ideas in a relatively obscure paper, which have therefore sadly been neglected 
in the free-will literature, despite their originality and novelty. In her book How Physics Makes us Free, 
Jenann Ismael (2016) has reached similar conclusions independently from Hoefer. The auxiliary condi-
tions are usually taken to be initial conditions, but see Sect. 4.3.
18 For all N,M ∈ {I, II, III, IV} , a theory that is Class N a and M b is Class max{N,M} according to the 
previous classification.
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Definition 5 Conditional interpretation If the agent had tried to do otherwise, then 
the agent would have succeeded.
4.1  Supervenience and multiple realizability
In statistical physics, macrostates supervene on microstates. Hence, whenever a 
macrostate obtains, there is an underlying microstate. Which microstate? This is 
hard to answer because macrostates are multiply realizable. (See the “Appendix 1” 
for a review of statistical mechanics.) Following List (2014), in the current con-
text we may think of the macrostate as an agential state: the state of the agent as 
described by the relevant higher-level (macroscopic, psychological) theory. This 
stands in contrast with the microstate or physical state as described by the lower-
level (microscopic, physical) theory.
Again following List (2014), the terms we just used can be defined as follows:
Definition 6 Supervenience No variation in the agential state is possible without a 
variation in the physical state.
Definition 7 Multiple Realizability Typically, more than one physical state corre-
sponds to a particular agential state; hence, not every variation in the physical state 
will give rise to a variation in the agential state.
So, crucially, the agential state is (1) supervenient on and fully determined by the 
physical state and (2) multiply realizable and more coarse-grained than the physical 
state.
4.2  Apparent indeterminism due to coarse‑graining
Now we return to Hoefer (2002): he drew his inspiration from statistical mechanics, 
so he considered deterministic microphysical laws and, like List (2014), he acknowl-
edged the important distinction between micro- and macrostates.
On Hoefer’s (2002) view, exactly one microstate is realized at any given time. 
This implies that the laws are deterministic (Class Ia), and the initial conditions are 
fully specified as well (Class Ib). This makes the theory Class I overall. In such a 
theory, there is no room for PAP.
However, according to Hoefer (2002), the agent cannot know the exact micro-
state, but only its coarse-grained, multiply realizable macrostate. The indeterminism 
which emerges at the coarse-grained macro-level is merely epistemic. Hence, for 
Hoefer, we can only explain our illusion of freedom: as far as we know, i.e. up to the 
macrostate, the present is compatible with multiple futures. But in reality, only one 
microstate obtains at any given time, which is compatible with only one possible 
future history.
Regarding historical counterfactuals, for Hoefer, the past has to remain the same 
macroscopically, and not “in all its gory microphysical detail” (2002, p. 215). Oth-
erwise it would indeed take “a miracle to get the if-had-done-otherwise scenario 
1 3
Synthese 
started.” By merely keeping the macroscopic past fixed, you “don’t need miracles 
to postulate various different actions and their likely future consequences” (2002, p. 
215). As a result, Hoefer focuses on the conditional interpretation of PAP, as defined 
at the start of Sect. 4.
The conditional interpretation relies on a counterfactual claim: if the agent had 
been in a different microstate compatible with (and for the agent indistinguishable 
from) the agent’s macrostate, then she would indeed have been successful in reach-
ing a different outcome than the current one. In terms of possible worlds, it makes 
sense to consider an agent who was determined to type ‘s’ in the actual world, while 
there exists a nearest counterfactual possible world in which she tries to do other-
wise and succeeds in typing ‘z’ instead.19 (See “Appendix 2” for more details on the 
typing example in terms of statistical mechanics.)
Fig. 2  Refinement of our proposed classification of theories, based on their laws and auxiliary conditions 
(ACs). The top row shows how different classes can be realized due to different kinds of laws. The bot-
tom row shows how different classes can be realized by different constraints on the ACs. The diagrams 
show an example with two possible histories, with time running from top to bottom. In the diagrams,  p1 
and  p2 indicate the presence of probabilities in the theories; their location indicates whether they pertain 
to initial conditions or subsequent branches. Question marks indicate the lack of probabilities or specifi-
cation of states in the theories
19 A complication here is that what the agent deems possible need not coincide with any physically pos-
sible world. But the program is to show the plausibility of alternative possibilities, not the accuracy of 
the agent’s representation of those possibilities.
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4.3  Freedom in intermediate conditions
In Sect. 3, we already introduced Hoefer’s (2002) proposal to consider the auxiliary 
conditions as an additional source of freedom, besides what is offered by the laws. 
We tend to think of the auxiliary conditions as fully specified initial conditions, but 
this leads to an additional argument in support of the challenge from determinism: 
the Consequence Argument.
4.3.1  The consequence argument
Clearly, there were no humans or other agents around at the time of the Big Bang to 
influence the initial conditions by their own free actions. This is also a key assump-
tion in Peter van Inwagen’s Consequence Argument (1975, 1983, 1989) against free 
will. In his Essay on Free Will, van Inwagen (1983, p. 16) formulated it as follows:
If determinism is true, then our acts are the consequences of the laws of nature 
and events in the remote past. But it is not up to us what went on before we 
were born; and neither is it up to us what the laws of nature are. Therefore, the 
consequences of these things (including our own acts) are not up to us (empha-
sis added).
Hoefer’s reply to this argument was twofold: (1) not only do the laws fail to pin 
down their own auxiliary conditions, (2) they also fail to specify where to draw the 
boundary. So, instead of a past boundary condition, we can add the present con-
dition to the dynamical rules and regard it as a constraint on the past and future. 
After all, we know most about the current situation, where we find ourselves—in 
medias res—choosing and acting. Why don’t we take this direct observation more 
seriously? This is exactly what Hoefer (2002, p. 221) proposed: “the direction of 
determination (and, for most free actions, correct explanation) is from your choices 
to the ways the physical world can be—both toward the past and the future.”
With his proposal, Hoefer denies a key premise of the Consequence Argument: 
our current actions do determine the conditions at the Big Bang—albeit very par-
tially and indirectly. While this viewpoint may be unusual, common practice does 
not suffice to disallow it. As Hoefer (2002, p. 208) emphasizes, determinism gives 
us “logical relations of determination, not a unique temporal relation of determina-
tion” (emphasis in original). In that sense, one is free to choose where to draw the 
determining slice.20 Hoefer argues that we might just as well draw the determining 
slice at the inside of the block universe, where we are now; hence his term: “free-
dom from the inside out”.
20 Or rather, when to draw it: the slice refers to a temporal slice or moment in time. In relativity theory, 
a moment in time is represented by a three-dimensional Cauchy hypersurface. Specifying the auxiliary 
conditions on this surface completely determines the entire past and future. Technically, a Cauchy hyper-
surface is an achronal set of spacelike separated events whose domain of influence (or Cauchy develop-
ment) covers the entire spacetime manifold, both to the past and the future of this surface. See Hawking 
and Ellis (1973) for details.
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However, this does not prevent someone else from drawing the determining slice 
at the Big Bang, and reasoning from then on forward in time. From that perspec-
tive, the initial conditions at the Big Bang predetermine everything, including all our 
thoughts, intentions, and actions. So, the challenge from determinism still applies.
4.3.2  Starry sky of free choices
Even if we would privilege the inside-out determination, this would not be enough 
to allow freedom at different points in time. We try to reconstruct Hoefer’s view on 
this and elaborate on it. First, he remarks that relativity theory has taught us that 
local events do not influence spatially removed events instantaneously. Instead, there 
are finite domains of influence. This allows us to think of determining events (free 
actions) as spread out across the bulk of the block universe, rather than as being all 
located in one temporal slice. As such, it is consistent to associate at least part of the 
information in the auxiliary conditions with the free choices of agents that happen in 
the course of the dynamical evolution that is governed by deterministic laws.
On this view, freedom is on a strict budget: there is only a sparse amount of free 
choices available—the equivalent of one three-dimensional hypersurface—com-
pared to the bulk of events in the four-dimensional volume of the block universe. 
This is unavoidable if all the freedom has to come from the auxiliary conditions. 
However, these free choices would be scattered within the block, yielding a starry 
sky of free choices in the middle of the block.
To conclude this section, recall that Hoefer defended a compatibilist account of 
free will, not a libertarian one. The aim of our paper, however, was to develop a 
libertarian account of free will that beats the challenge from determinism. Hoefer 
(2002) doesn’t seem to think this is possible, but List clearly thinks otherwise, as we 
will see in the next section.
5  The modal interpretation of PAP
List (2019b) took the conditional interpretation of PAP to be insufficient for libertar-
ian free will and argued that PAP requires a modal interpretation:
Definition 8 Modal interpretation It is possible for the agent to do otherwise (there 
are forks in the road).
Before offering our own proposal, we first review List’s (2014, 2019a).
5.1  Emergent indeterminism
List (2014, 2019a) granted that the free-will sceptic might be right in conclud-
ing that, at the level of deterministic fundamental physics, there are no alterna-
tive possibilities. The mistake, according to List, is to claim that there are no 
alternative possibilities at all: free will is a higher-level concept, belonging to 
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the domain of the special sciences. As such, we should look for free will (and the 
ability to do otherwise) at the macroscopic agential level, not at the microscopic 
physical level.
5.1.1  Physical and agential levels
List (2019a) contended that the challenge from determinism, as outlined in Sect. 1.2, 
involves a category mistake due to a mixing of different levels. Premise (P2), after 
all, is a thesis about physical possibility, not agential possibility. It pertains to what 
is nomologically possible on the microscopic level. Yet, when discussing free will, 
we are interested in agential possibility or what is possible on the macroscopic level. 
The challenge from determinism should thus be modified to read:
Challenge from determinism*
(P1)  Libertarian free will requires PAP;
(P2)  Agential determinism rules out PAP;
(C)  Free will and agential determinism are incompatible.
In this modified form, the challenge from determinism shows that libertarian free 
will requires indeterminism at the agential level, but not necessarily at the physical 
level. This opens up a potential new avenue for libertarian free will.
For this, List had to show that determinism at the physical level is compatible 
with indeterminism at the agential level. We are convinced by his argument, the 
main points of which we summarized in “Appendix 3”, together with their con-
nection to statistical mechanics, which helps to unify List’s proposal with Hoefer’s 
(2002) work.
List (2019a) called his account of free will compatibilist libertarianism. It is 
compatibilist because it takes nomological determinism to be compatible with free 
will and it is libertarian because free will requires agential indeterminism to allow 
for alternative possibilities—unlike other compatibilist accounts of free will. The 
source of List’s agential indeterminism is the multiple realizability of a macrostate 
by microstates: multiple physical microstates can realize one and the same psycho-
logical macrostate while leading to different alternative outcomes under the deter-
ministic dynamics.
5.1.2  Two shortcomings and a way out
Although we find List’s work very inspiring, by itself it does not fully succeed. We 
see at least two shortcomings.
First, the agent must have alternative possibilities in the actual world, not merely 
in counterfactual situations. In order to have plenty of genuine alternatives, in the 
sense of PAP**, we need a Class III theory, as discussed above. However, because 
of supervenience, we need it not only at the macro-level (as List has successfully 
shown) but also at the micro-level. That is, we not only require PAP at the agential 
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level, but also at the physical level. Otherwise, emergent indeterminism is merely 
due to epistemic constraints.21
Secondly, List (2014, 2019a) did not explain how the agent can use this scope to 
act freely in a deterministic world. List (2019b) discussed agential causation, but he 
did not really specify how it is supposed to work.
To overcome these two shortcomings, we return to Hoefer (2002), who (1) 
emphasized the selection of auxiliary conditions by the agent and (2) can be reinter-
preted in a way that may bring PAP at the physical level within reach.
5.1.3  A bold step: bundles of microstates
Class III theories have probability gaps, which leave room at the physical level for 
the agential level to act upon to have a real (as opposed to an epiphenomenal or illu-
sory) effect on the microphysical state of affairs. This requires branching in at least 
some points in the microphysical histories (Class II or higher), as well as freedom 
from statistical regularities to allow these acts to be truly free (so, at least Class III, 
as already mentioned).
According to Hoefer (2002), such libertarian ‘freedom from the inside out’ would 
require that we could have done otherwise starting from the exact same initial micro-
conditions. But this is impossible if we assume deterministic laws. Assuming Class 
Ia laws, however, we can still introduce Class III indeterminacy via the auxiliary 
conditions (Class IIIb).
Indeed, even if one requires PAP (or PAP**) at the physical level, Hoefer’s sta-
tistical mechanical account of compatibilist free will leaves room for a libertarian 
interpretation, if we take a bold step: let us, for a moment, assume that the present 
is not determined by a single microstate, but by a bundle of microstates. The sug-
gestion in other words is to interpret the multiple realizability claim ontically, rather 
than epistemically. The idea is that a macrostate is not only multiply realizable, it is 
multiply realized. Let us now flesh out this proposal. We will do this in two steps. 
The first step (in Sect. 5.2) is merely a ladder, to be kicked away once the proposal is 
clear (in Sect. 5.4).
5.2  Pruning bundles
As remarked before, Hoefer takes there to be an actual microstate (unknown to the 
agent), whereas List (2019b, pp. 91–92) claims that there is no privileged microstate 
‘within’ an agential state:
[A]t the psychological level, there is no fact of the matter as to which pre-
cise physical state obtains. […] [T]he higher-level state, at any time, does not 
21 After all, each microstate corresponds to a different auxiliary condition on which the deterministic 
laws can act. So, if we consider humans in combination with a fully specified micro-physical state of a 
supposedly deterministic universe, then no alternatives remain.
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determine which underlying lower-level state obtains, and so we cannot treat 
any one of the lower-level states as the “true” one.
Although we do not attribute the following view to List, one could interpret this 
ontically by considering the macrostate as a common instant in an equivalence class 
of microhistories (where we use the term ‘history’ as defined in “Appendix 1”). In 
other words: we can think of a bundle of histories passing through the given mac-
rostate at a given time. The alternative possibilities correspond to a partition into 
smaller bundles that pass from the current macrostate to multiple future macrostates. 
Effecting a choice then amounts to pruning all the other bundles but the chosen one. 
If the bundle contains infinitely many microhistories to begin with, this process may 
continue for countably many choices throughout history.
5.2.1  Typing example
To see how this works, consider again Hoefer’s typing example mentioned in 
Sect. 4.2 (now using the notation from “Appendix 2”). At t = 0 , you choose to type 
the letter ‘t’. You thereby select the macroregion 훤Mt . Since this macrostate is multi-
ply realized by all the microstates x(0) ∈ 훤Mt , we have to keep track of their evolu-
tion through phase space. This bundle of trajectories starts off in 훤Mt and ends up in 
the new region 휙1
(
훤Mt
)
 at t = 1 . Due to Liouville’s theorem, 휇
(
훤Mt
)
= 휇
(
휙1
(
훤Mt
))
 . 
The phase space region 휙1
(
훤Mt
)
 however will typically be split over two or more 
macrostates. Let us assume that it is spread over 훤Ms and 훤Mz.
The situation at t = 1 thus leaves you with two choices: typing ‘s’ or ‘z’. Suppose 
you freely choose to type the letter ‘s’. You thereby select the macroregion 훤Ms , more 
specifically, the region 훤Ms ∩ 휙1
(
훤Mt
)
 corresponding to the overlap between 훤Ms and 
휙1
(
훤Mt
)
 . It is as if your free choice has pruned part of the region 휙1
(
훤Mt
)
 , leaving 
the subregion 훤Ms ∩ 휙1
(
훤Mt
)
.
5.2.2  Thinning bundles
The presentation in the previous paragraph was only forward-looking, but we may 
also reflect on the effect of pruning on the past bundle. If we take the past parts of 
non-selected histories as cut off as well, choices at an intermediate time thin out 
the bundle over all of time. This may eventually lead to a thin bundle or even a sin-
gle microhistory throughout all of time. There are no branching points for this his-
tory, and it may be presented as ‘the’ block universe, although it was selected from 
branching points in bundles of histories—one among many possible block universes.
To get real freedom in this picture, we have to adopt an ontic view: the exact 
microstate is not fixed, only the coarse-grained macrostate is. That is, the initial con-
ditions (at the time of the Big Bang) were only partially fixed, and therefore com-
patible with multiple futures. Whenever we make a free choice, we add a further 
constraint which refines the initial conditions.22 The evolution of our universe does 
22 On an epistemic reading, we merely become aware of what we choose: this knowledge may also affect 
our knowledge of the past. On an ontic reading, affecting choices could be considered as a form of cau-
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not correspond to a single trajectory in phase space, but to a bundle of trajectories, 
which is increasingly pruned every time a free choice is made. For a related view, 
see also Cristi Stoica (2012).23
To be clear, this idea is not endorsed by Hoefer. In fact, this mode of presenta-
tion has fallen into the trap that Hoefer (2002, p. 206) called “the unholy marriage” 
of the eternalist, physical viewpoint, which presents events as a four-dimensional 
block universe, with our presentist, subjective experience of events, as they unfold 
right now. But this need not be a fatal objection, for we can rephrase the above pro-
posal without reference to the dynamics of pruning on bundles of histories. Doing so 
effectively regains Hoefer’s idea of freedom from the inside out, but it now yields a 
libertarian reading (instead of Hoefer’s own compatibilist reading).
5.3  Principle of action uniqueness—against diverging worlds
Before we kick away our ladder, a warning is in order. Our bundle theory should 
be contrasted with an account of diverging worlds, in which each possibility gets 
realized in a different world (i.e., a different block universe), leading to a block mul-
tiverse. The latter would be in tension with free will. The tension is with a principle 
that is rarely spelled out, but which we make explicit here:24,25
Definition 9 Principle of action uniqueness (PAU) When an agent successfully 
carries out an action freely chosen out of a set of mutually incompatible alternatives, 
only the agent’s chosen action is realized.
Multiverse determinism says you could have done otherwise, and did so (in a 
parallel branch). So, all alternative possibilities were realized. PAU, on the other 
hand, requires that you could have acted otherwise, but didn’t. So only one alterna-
tive possibility was realized. We argue that PAU completes PAP, by stipulating that 
the agent takes one and only one action (in the relevant choice moment). The agent 
could have, but has not actually, acted otherwise (say, in a parallel world or a differ-
ent part of the multiverse).
If we want an account of free will that satisfies both PAP and PAU, the above 
proposal for a diverging-worlds theory is ruled out. PAU requires determinateness 
of choice outcomes (which are intermediate conditions), not just relative to a branch 
(i.e., a block universe), but absolutely and overall. The principle is reminiscent of 
sation, in which case the proposal in the second paragraph would be bicausal. In other words, choices 
would have retrocausal effects on the past, as well as causal effects on the future.
Footnote 22 (continued)
23 Although Stoica (2012) investigated this idea in the context of quantum mechanics, he did consider 
the deterministic case explicitly: “A deterministic universe can have incompletely determined initial con-
ditions, which can be refined by ulterior choices.”
24 Due to multiple realizability, the realization of a macroscopic alternative is compatible with a bundle 
of real histories rather than a unique real history. For simplicity, in what follows we assume that unique 
outcomes for all choices lead to a unique real history. In principle, this may still be a thin bundle instead.
25 Under the header “The irrelevance of forks”, Saka (manuscript) has reached a similar conclusion.
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the requirement for definite outcomes in quantum mechanics, which is used by 
opponents of the many worlds approach.26 Here, too, PAU serves as a uniqueness 
condition that rules out a multiverse or bundle interpretation.
In other words, PAU requires us to treat the full ensemble of block universes as 
merely hypothetical, not actual. Within this hypothetical bundle, there is only one 
real history (past and present); this is similar to the medieval concept of the actual 
history as a thin red line (Øhrstrøm and Hasle 2015).27
5.4  Block universe regained
Now we are ready to show how Hoefer’s freedom from the inside out may be com-
bined with List’s compatibilist libertarianism. Our proposal in Sect. 5.2 (the ladder) 
was Class Ia and IIIb at the microphysical level, so Class III overall at the micro-
physical level. Our final proposal is Class I at the microphysical level and Class III 
at the agential macro-level.
We can assume that the laws at the micro-level remain fully deterministic (Class 
Ia) and that there is a unique initial condition (Class Ib). Like Hoefer, however, we 
are free to interpret this initial condition as being the net result of all free choices 
over the course of history (recall Sect. 4.3). These choices cannot be ‘seen’ at the 
level of a single microphysical history, which contains no branching points (by the 
assumption of microphysical determinism). Instead, they are located at the higher 
level of macrostates of such microphysical histories: each macrostate corresponds 
to a region of the phase space, which we interpret as a bundle of hypothetical block 
universes, including all the options we do not choose. That is, the macro-, agential 
histories do have branching points and thus offer real alternatives.
As List and others have shown, higher-level probabilism (Class II) is indeed 
compatible with micro-level determinism (Class I). But List may have overlooked 
the fact that agential choice need not even be governed by chance: it may be as free 
as Class III. The fact that this is a form of non-probabilistic indeterminism becomes 
especially clear if we regard it, as Hoefer does, as stemming from a freedom equiva-
lent to setting the initial conditions, which is unconstrained by the dynamics of the 
equations themselves. The freedom of agents thus relies in their ability to select aux-
iliary conditions at the macro-level. This selection is bounded by possibilities, but 
unbounded by probabilities. Their range is fixed due to the underlying phase space, 
where each macrostate is surrounded by only a finite number of other macrostates, 
each of which corresponds to a possible future action. But there is no additional 
probability distribution over this range. So, this is Class III at the agential level, but 
not beyond. Although this does not allow as much freedom as Class IV, we have 
argued that this is all we need to be truly free as suggested in our motivation for 
PAP**.
26 For instance, the requirement is called ‘determinate outcomes’ by Maudlin (1995).
27 Or, at most, a subset of the full bundle is real: cf. footnote 24.
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In short, the upshot of this reading is that we have something akin to a Class III 
theory at the agential level, fully compatible with Class I at the microphysical level. 
Now that we have kicked away the ladder of an actual bundle theory, we are back at 
a unique block universe, just like Hoefer. Yet, we have managed to give a libertarian 
account of free will within a single deterministic universe, just like List, by taking 
into account the hypothetical ensemble or bundle of block universes.
6  Conclusions
Let us now take stock. In this paper, we have made at least four contributions to the 
contemporary debate on the freedom of will.
6.1  Classification of theories
Firstly, we proposed a classification of theories (Fig. 1) based on how much freedom 
they allow. This classification makes explicit at least two points that are often left 
implicit. It shows that beyond the determinism–indeterminism dilemma, there is a 
wider range of options. Indeterminism comes in different degrees; we distinguished 
three. Moreover, our more fine-grained classification (Fig.  2) shows that both the 
laws and the auxiliary conditions can place constraints that allow more or less free-
dom. We hope that this classification will help to clarify the debate. In particular, 
we think it helps to analyze a central tension in the free-will debate: a scientific 
worldview pulls towards lower-number classes, while libertarianism pulls towards 
higher-number classes.
Usually the question about human freedom is asked in a categorical, all-or-noth-
ing way. However, our analysis suggests, among other things, that freedom may be a 
gradable notion rather than a Boolean on/off switch. In our paper, we have looked at 
the spectrum of theoretical possibilities, hence the ‘degrees of freedom’ in the title 
of this article (with a nod to its technical meaning in physics). A complementary 
way to read our proposal is that it exposes a free-will spectrum of sorts: we hope this 
viewpoint will inspire future work.
While the classification that we developed deals with the amount of freedom that 
various theories admit, it might be interesting to explore the connection to a differ-
ent debate: whether freedom applies in different degrees to various living beings. 
For instance, in his correspondence with Saint–Venant, Boussinesq defended the 
position that consciousness and free will may apply to animals in various degrees, 
depending on their complexity (see, for instance, Mueller 2015, p. 628).
6.2  Auxiliary conditions
Secondly, taking our cue from Hoefer (2002), we have given a specific interpreta-
tion to the auxiliary conditions. In the context of statistical mechanics, an interval of 
auxiliary conditions corresponds to a region in phase space. We have made explicit 
that this also corresponds to a bundle of block universes. Whereas the laws specify 
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possible trajectories in phase space, or possible block universes, they do not deter-
mine their own auxiliary conditions. Hence, the auxiliary conditions leave free-
dom in a direction orthogonal to that of the laws, so to speak. This may leave some 
room for a form of non-nomological indeterminism within a generally physicalist 
approach.
6.3  Libertarian free will
Thirdly, we aimed to combine crucial elements from the work of Hoefer and List 
and attempted to give a libertarian reading of this combination. Our proposal for 
a combination is as follows: (1) We assume a deterministic microtheory and an 
indeterministic macrotheory, (2) like List and unlike Hoefer, we require PAP at the 
agential level, and (3) like Hoefer, we assume agents can use the macroscopic inde-
terminism. What we have called the ‘starry sky of free choices’ is crucial to make 
the third element work: throughout spacetime, there is a certain amount of freedom 
(equivalent to setting the initial, intermediate or final conditions) that can be inter-
preted as the result of agential choices. As such, the totality of all agential choices 
in spacetime determines (part of) the auxiliary conditions, from the inside out, as 
Hoefer would call it.
6.4  Varieties of PAP
Fourthly, our paper focused on one libertarian principle: the principle of alterna-
tive possibilities. In examining PAP throughout the paper, we have proposed three 
ways to strengthen it. In PAP*, we added that the alternatives should not be bound 
by probabilities, in order to escape statistical determinism. In PAP**, we added 
that there should be sufficiently many alternatives, such that the agent does not feel 
restricted by a limited menu. (In passing, we remarked that some libertarians may 
require even more: that there be no menu at all, allowing truly novel options to arise. 
We have not developed this here.)
Finally, we added the principle of action uniqueness to PAP (or a strengthened 
version thereof): PAU stipulates that exactly one of the alternatives is chosen, which 
is relevant in the context of multiverse or actual bundle theories. Combining PAP 
and PAU brings out a second central tension in the free-will discussion: the require-
ment of real alternatives, at a moment when an agent has a choice, of which only 
one is realized subsequently.
This tension has been part of the free-will debate since antiquity and is closely 
related to the issue of future contingents. Unsurprisingly, our proposal in the final 
section of our paper is also similar to a medieval suggestion: that of the actual his-
tory (past and future) as a thin red line. Within the formalism of statistical mechan-
ics, this thin red line can be represented as a privileged trajectory in the sample 
space. And this can also be interpreted as one actual block universe in an infinite 
bundle of possible block universes.
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Appendix 1: Review of statistical mechanics
There is no unified and generally accepted formalism of statistical mechanics, 
instead there are two: the Boltzmannian approach and the Gibbsian approach. For 
our purposes, the Boltzmannian approach is the most useful one.
Microstates
Consider a dynamic system S of N point-particles. The system can be in a number 
of states which evolve over time. The set of all possible states of S is called the 
state space of S . In the case of Boltzmannian statistical mechanics, the state of S is 
provided by the (fine-grained) microstate x = (q, p) , which specifies the positions 
q = q1,… , q3N and momenta p = p1,… , p3N of all the particles, and the state space 
is the 6N-dimensional phase space 훤 .
The change of the system’s microstate over time t is governed by the Hamiltonian 
equations of motion:
with H(q, p) the Hamiltonian of the system. This induces a phase flow 휙t ∶ 훤 → 훤  
on the phase space, with 휙t a one-to-one mapping. For example, if the system starts 
out in the microstate x(0) ∈ 훤  at time t = 0 , it will trace out a trajectory in phase 
space under the Hamiltonian dynamics, and be mapped to 휙1−0(x) = x(1) ∈ 훤  at 
time t = 1 . What is important for our purposes is that the Hamiltonian dynamics, 
which maps an initial state to its final state, is perfectly deterministic.
dqi
dt
=
휕H
휕pi
;
dpi
dt
= −
휕H
휕qi
,
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Histories
The temporal path of the system through phase space is called its history. Formally, 
the history of S is a map h from the reals (time) into the system’s phase space, 
assigning to each instant of time t a corresponding microstate x(t) of S:
If the system S starts out in a different microstate, it will trace out a different tra-
jectory in 훤  , yielding a different history h′ for S.
Notice that the different possible trajectories in 훤  represent different possible 
block universes—or different possible worlds in the terminology of our definition for 
determinism, satisfying the same Hamiltonian laws of evolution. Due to the Hamil-
tonian dynamics, each of these block universes is completely deterministic. Which 
one of these possible block universes gets actualized depends on the auxiliary con-
ditions (i.e., on which microstate is selected as initial—or final, or intermediate—
state, see Sect. 4.3).
Liouville’s theorem
The phase space 훤  is further endowed with the Lebesgue measure 휇 . According to 
Liouville’s theorem, the Lebesgue measure is preserved under the dynamics of the 
system. That is, the dynamic evolution of a system will preserve the volume of its 
initial phase space region:
for all regions R ⊆ 𝛤  . The shape of R , on the other hand, can change quite dramati-
cally over time.28 In summary, the mathematical framework of Boltzmannian statis-
tical mechanics is the triple ⟨훤 ,휙t,휇⟩.
Macrostates
Now, let M denote the set of all (coarse-grained) macrostates Mi ( i = 1,… ,m ) of 
the system. Each macrostate specifies the state of the system at a macroscopic level 
of grain, but not the microscopic configuration of all the point-particles. There is 
therefore a many-to-one mapping 휎 from 훤  into M , such that for every microstate x 
h ∶ ℝ → 훤 ; t ↦ x(t).
휇(R) = 휇
(
휙t(R)
)
,
28 This is the case in particular for systems with chaotic dynamics. Informally, deterministic chaos 
occurs for systems that have regions in their phase space such that nearby points evolve to points that are 
far removed. This is related to the property of sensitive dependence on initial conditions and the rate of 
separation is made numerically precise by the Lyapunov exponent. Werndl (2009b) has argued that chaos 
is best defined in terms of mixing on a subset of the phase space. (Here, mixing is a mathematical notion 
inspired by the physical notion: see Werndl’s paper for the precise definition.) Werndl concludes that “for 
predicting any event at any level of precision 𝜀 > 0 , all sufficiently past events are approximately proba-
bilistically irrelevant.”.
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in 훤  there is exactly one corresponding macrostate 휎(x) = M(x) in M , but where a 
given macrostate Mi in M can be realized by more than one microstate x in 훤 .
Every macrostate Mi picks out a particular macroregion 훤Mi in phase space:
such that the different 훤Mi form a partition (or coarse-graining) of 훤  . In other words, 
the different Mi do not overlap and jointly cover 훤 :
With the help of the supervenience mapping 휎 from microstates to macrostates,29 
we can turn every fine-grained history h into a coarse-grained history 학 , with
Appendix 2: Counterfactuals and Hoefer’s typing example in terms 
of statistical mechanics
According to Hoefer (2002), when an agent makes a free choice—for instance, the 
choice to type the letter ‘t’ on her laptop—she thereby selects a particular mac-
rostate, say Mt , corresponding to this coarse-grained action. There is usually an 
enormous number of microstates x corresponding to each macrostate (multiple real-
izability). So, which x will be realized by freely choosing Mt ? “When I freely choose 
to type the ‘t’,” says Hoefer (2002, p. 211), “I do not thereby choose to actualize a 
particular microstate!” (emphasis in original). The best we can say is that “some 
one of this enormous number of microstate-types shall be, and that is all” (2002, 
p. 210). This sounds reasonable. After all, when we say that we feel free, we do not 
mean to imply that we have the power to influence every single atom by our free 
actions. We merely intend to say that we have the power to shape the world in a very 
coarse-grained way.30
훤Mi
∶=
{
x ∈ 훤 |M(x) = Mi},
훤Mi
∩ 훤Mj = �;
m⋃
i=1
훤Mi
= 훤 .
𝕙 ∶ ℝ→ M;t ↦ M(t) = 휎(x(t)).
29 In statistical physics, the supervenience mapping from micro- to macrostates is also crucial to define 
entropy: the Boltzmann entropy of a microstate depends logarithmically on the number of microstates 
‘in’ (that is, consistent with) the corresponding macrostate. To be specific, the Boltzmann entropy of a 
macrostate M is defined as S
B(M) = kB log
[
휇
(
훤
M
)]
 , with k
B
 the Boltzmann constant.
30 The mechanism by which one freely selects one or the other macrostate is left underspecified by Hoe-
fer. Hoefer is skeptical about strong reductionism and does not subscribe to the idea of causal complete-
ness with upward causation from the microphysical to the macrophysical. Instead, Hoefer endorses the 
perspective of downward causation from the macrophysical to the microphysical. Thus “my intention to 
type the letter ‘t’ causes the particular motions experienced by all the atoms in my left forefinger as I type 
it […] rather than (for example) the immediately preceding motions of other nearby atoms, or any other 
such particle-level events” (2002, 201, emphasis added). That is, our choices, thoughts and intentions are 
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According to Hoefer, PAP is at “the heart of the issue” (2002, p. 214). What is 
really interesting about Hoefer’s account of free will is that it leaves room for coun-
terfactual beliefs. That is the sense in which we take Hoefer’s account to be “much 
more robust” than other compatibilist accounts (2002, p. 203). “When I type the 
letter ‘s’ I may think that I could have chosen to type a ‘z’ instead […]. And I think 
I could have done so, with the past being, macroscopically, just the way I know it to 
be” (2002, p. 214, emphasis in original).
Here is what we take Hoefer to mean. Consider Fig.  3 (which is explained in 
more general terms in “Appendix 3”). When you choose to type the letter ‘t’ at t = 0 , 
you thereby selected the macroregion 훤Mt . A particular microstate x(0) ∈ 훤Mt was 
thereby realized at random, or at least beyond your control. Now, under the Hamilto-
nian dynamics, x(0) will deterministically evolve to x(1) at t = 1 . And as it turns out 
x(1) ∈ 훤Ms , where 훤Ms is the macroregion corresponding to you typing the letter ‘s’.
However, even though it was predetermined that you would type an ‘s’ after you 
typed the letter ‘t’, you still have the feeling that you could have typed a ‘z’ instead. 
What grounds this belief, according to Hoefer, is that there is indeed another micro-
state x�(0) ∈ 훤Mt which could have been realized instead of x(0) , and which evolves 
to x�(1) ∈ 훤Mz at t = 1 with 훤Mz the macroregion corresponding to you typing the 
letter ‘z’.31
Hoefer (2002), like List (2014), thus finds freedom in the multitude of micro-
states realizing the same macroscopic present, but leading to different futures and 
world histories. Whereas List modified the interpretation of PAP, such that it can 
apply in a deterministic world, Hoefer explained why PAP appears to (but does not 
actually) apply in such a context.
Appendix 3: PAP from multiple realizability
List (2019a) argued that the challenge from determinism shows that libertarian free 
will requires indeterminism at the agential level, but not necessarily at the physical 
level. Here, the link with Boltzmannian microstates and macrostates, as introduced 
in “Appendix 1”, is easily made.32 To be precise, let the agential states correspond to 
the macrostates Mi and the physical states to the microstates x = (q, p) . (1) The mac-
rostates in M supervene on the microstates in 훤  . In other words, you cannot change 
Mi without changing x : this is supervenience (see Definition 6). And, (2) to each 
microstate corresponds exactly one macrostate, but many distinct microstates can 
correspond to the same macrostate: this is multiple realizability (see Definition 7).
Footnote 30 (continued)
primary explainers of our physical actions (2002, 207). It thus seems Hoefer is assuming a form of non-
reductive physicalism.
31 Hoefer emphasized that “we are not concerned with the actual past history of the world in all its 
microscopic detail; that does, of course, determine the present” (2002, 216, emphasis in original).
32 Although List does not expound his theory in these terms, it can be easily adopted to a statistical 
mechanics framework. To the best of our knowledge, List only makes the link with statistical mechanics 
in the conclusions of his 2014 paper (174): “This echoes the way in which statistical mechanics accounts 
for the emergence of stochasticity in a deterministic Newtonian world.”.
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As List (2014) observed, the multiple realizability of macrostates by microstates 
makes it possible for the supervenience mapping 휎 to be such that determinism at 
the micro-level is mapped to indeterminism at the macro-level. In the context of 
physics, List was not the first to consider this idea. Charlotte Werndl (2009a) has 
given examples of observationally equivalent systems that can be modelled by deter-
ministic and stochastic equations.33
The coexistence of micro-level determinism and macro-level indeterminism 
can be understood better with the help of Fig. 3 (which is inspired by Fig. 1 in 
List and Pivato 2015). In the top part of Fig. 3, every circle represents a possi-
ble microstate x ∈ 훤  of the system at a particular time t  . At the start, t = 0 , the 
system can be in one of multiple microstates: for definiteness, we have indicated 
three of them. Each of these possible microstates evolves in time, tracing out a 
trajectory through phase space, as indicated by the various lines connecting the 
dots. Each trajectory represents one of the three possible histories hj ( j = 1 → 3 ). 
All histories are deterministic, since no branching occurs at the micro-level.
Fig. 3  In these two diagrams, microstate x is represented as a one-dimensional, continuous variable and 
time t  (running from top to bottom) is taken to be discrete. Microstates are indicated by small circles, 
macrostates by larger ellipses. Histories are indicated by lines between instantaneous states. The diagram 
at the top shows micro-level determinism; the diagram at the bottom shows that this is compatible with 
macro-level indeterminism
33 See also Butterfield (2012) for a terminologically distinct account of how micro-level determinism 
can be compatible with macro-level indeterminism.
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The macro-level supervenes on the micro-level. That is, to each microstate x cor-
responds a macrostate M(x) , as represented by the ellipses in the bottom diagram. 
Specifically, all microstates lying in the same x-interval are mapped to the same 
macrostate (multiple realizability), with the ellipses representing the different mac-
roregions 훤M(x) . To every history hj at the physical micro-level corresponds a coarse-
grained history 학j = 휎
(
hj
)
 at the agential macro-level. In this case, however, branch-
ing points do occur, leading to indeterminism. For instance, although the three 
histories are the same initially, they diverge at t = 1 . Clearly then, indeterminism at 
the macro-level is consistent with determinism at the micro-level, given superveni-
ence and multiple realizability. Call this emergent indeterminism.
The reasoning here works in both directions (indeterminism at the macroscale 
can emerge from determinism at the microscale) and can be iterated: for exam-
ple, it is consistent to consider determinism at the micro- and macroscale with 
indeterminism at the mesoscale. This can be iterated indefinitely (List and Pivato 
2015, section  9). In addition, it is also possible to consider different classes of 
indeterminism at different levels. An idea of this kind was present in the work of 
Quetelet, who presumed that at the level of populations humans are more predict-
able than at the individual level, without being fully deterministic.
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